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IS BREAKTHROUGH LIKELY IN TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT SETTLEMENT?
Commentary by Anatol Golea, Infotag political observer.
Part 1 of 2. Caucasus events are a new catalyst for Transnistria talks.
In mid-April 2008, Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov held in Bendery city their first personal meeting over last 7 years. And although the contact appeared to be fairly cool, the very fact of it let the official Chisinau start speaking of a ‘breakthrough’ in its relations with Tiraspol and of a soon-to-be final settlement of the 18-year-long Transnistria conflict.
The Moldovan authorities thoroughly prepared to that meeting. They undertook a whole series of PR actions in anticipation of the event. For instance, they stated Chisinau would recognize and guarantee the ownership rights of participants in privatization in Transnistria; called to resume a full-scale negotiation process; began drafting documents for discussion; stood up with a whole package of initiatives aimed at building trust between the sides, etc. But the chief thing was that Chisinau demonstrated its maximum loyalty with respect to Russia, and has thus enlisted Russia’s support in a sense that Transnistria would not be placed in one line with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
It is no secret that the Transnistria question is actively used by all Moldovan and Transnistrian politicians in their electoral interests. So one could expect that with the parliamentary elections approaching, the Moldovan authorities would try and bring the Transnistria topic back onto the agenda. And the above-mentioned April meeting, held one year before the 2009 elections, proved those expectations. Voronin has practically revised its 2001 position on the inexpediency of speaking to Smirnov, who, Voronin claimed then, only used bilateral meetings and negotiations for solving his petty current problems.
The April meeting gave grounds for a cautious optimism to all participants in the Transnistrian conflict settlement. Voronin and Smirnov stated then the road to negotiations was opened, experts would resume work, and the working groups formed then would function regularly. In addition, the two irreconcilable opponents stated they would be meeting regularly as frequently as would be necessary for solving emerging problems.
But those were merely cool diplomatic statements for the Transnistrian pressmen who were in time for the Bendery meeting. The Moldovan press learnt about the event only from concise announcements made by the Presidential Press Service. And a subsequent media briefing in Chisinau was open only to the publications loyal to President Voronin. He knows such publications never ask inconvenient questions.
It was clear even then that the allegations about a ‘breakthrough’ were too exaggerated, and that there was nothing particularly outstanding to boast about. Each side remained with its interest: the Moldovan President spoke about on the need to implement his initiatives on building trust and bringing positions closer, while the Tiraspol leader was insisting that Moldova must give its answer (certainly, positive) to Transnistria’s initiative on signing an inter-state Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation. Last April, Voronin received that document, absolutely unacceptable for Chisinau, from Smirnov’s hands.
The product of that meeting in April was the holding of several sessions of profiled working groups, who tried to solve the problems that have accumulated over years in the fields of economy, transport, resumption of regular railroad communication via the Transnistrian region, etc. But already the first working meetings of experts showed that the years of silence and lack of contacts made the sides’ former discords assume the depth of an impassable abyss. Very shortly after that, the experts saw their meetings would be just useless, and stopped them. The ‘breakthrough’ was thus put off.
But, as the saying goes, every cloud has a silver lining. The situation around South Ossetia and Abkhazia that emerged last month once again raised the Transnistrian topic from oblivion. The warfare between Russia and Georgia was a reminiscence to the world community that there still exist some lingering, frozen conflicts, including the Transnistrian one.
On the one hand, Chisinau got a chance to avail itself of a favorable situation and to try at least to resume the negotiation process, which topic had been actively discussed throughout the months since the Bendery meeting. On the other hand, the situation was not simply favorable but very delicate, too. Moldova was supposed to somehow react to the Caucasus events. And it had to act in a way to make no offense to Russia – the key player in the Transnistrian conflict settlement process – and, at the same time, to make no quarrel with its GUAM partner – Georgia, being backed by the United States and some leading European Union member countries.
And Chisinau arrived at a really Solomonic decision: Moldova stated nothing, and only announced its sharing the statement on the Caucasus events made by the European Union, which demanded to pull out troops and resolve the conflict peacefully. At that moment, this was quite enough for Chisinau so as to preserve relative neutrality.
Shortly after that, however, the need emerged to concretize the position. Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and was expecting from its main partners support and understanding in a new confrontation with the West. It would be naïve to expect such backing from countries that themselves come across the problem of preserving their territorial integrity. So, the official Chisinau had to speak out more concretely on the issue. The Government stated that like in the case with Kosovo independence recognition, this step only reduces the responsibility of the conflicting sides in their quest for a compromise between nations.
Having spoken out for looking for “fair and up-to-date decisions based on the observance of territorial integrity principles and guarantees of human rights and freedoms”, the Moldovan Government stressed “the absence of whatever relation or analogies between the Caucasus situation and the situation in the Transnistrian region”.
Shortly after that, Voronin met with Russia President Dmitry Medvedev. The Moldovan leader provided an extra explanation of the complicated situation in Moldova, while Medvedev slashed Voronin’s recent political partner – President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili who, on the Western partners’ request, came to Chisinau in 2005 to render political assistance to Voronin and his party in parliamentary elections then. Voronin and Medvedev found a common language. Their meeting showed that the Moldovan authorities have pre-empted some events: by reaching a compromise with Moscow, Chisinau succeeded in overcoming a sharp crisis in relations with Russia, in changing Russia’s attitude to Transnistria, and in preventing the Kremlin’s recognition of the separatist region along with the two other self-proclaimed republics – Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In their turn, Tiraspol leaders also tried to derive a maximum advantage from the Caucasus situation by reiterating endlessly that Chisinau had not backed Russia’s position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. To make that reminding more convincing, the Transnistrian ministry of foreign affairs even announced a moratorium on any contacts with Chisinau – at least “until the Moldovan leadership condemns the Georgia’s aggression resolutely and unconditionally”.
The Transnistrian foreign ministry stirred up passions by claiming that “Chisinau has lately chosen the same course as Tbilissi and is pursuing the same objectives: to change the format of talks and to minimize Russia’s role in order to create conditions for a forcible solution of the Transnistria conflict”.
However, the fairly well balanced position of Chisinau’s was perceived with understanding both by the West and by Russia. Moldova’s diplomatic efforts prompted all the 5+2 format participants to taking measures to create prerequisites for talks resumption: Medvedev summoned Smirnov to Moscow, the international mediators and observes held a meeting in Vienna, and all parties began preparing a meeting between Voronin and Smirnov that may take place already before the end of September. At any rate, right after the meeting with Medvedev, Smirnov lifted the above-mentioned moratorium on contacts with Chisinau, and began saying “better a bad peace than a good quarrel”. So, the tragic events on the Caucasus became kind of a catalyst for a possible resumption of talks on Transnistrian conflict settlement.
(Commentary to be continued.)
