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IS BREAKTHROUGH LIKELY IN TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT SETTLEMENT?
Commentary by Anatol Golea, Infotag political observer.
Part 2 of 2. Negotiations Possible, Result Uncertain.
The would-be meeting between Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov is being discussed in Tiraspol and Moscow, and was tackled at the recent 3+2 consultations in Vienna. However, Chisinau is being somewhat reserved in its statements on the future event, for officials here do not feel very much like advertising the forthcoming dialog with “the separatist regime leader”, and are placing emphasis on the 5+2 format.
In the present-day situation, practically all parties are interested in resuming talks, so it is not quite clear why they have not been resumed till now. Chisinau’s interest is unquestionable: the talks can give not only a chance for resolving the conflict but, essentially, can promote success at the 2009 parliamentary elections, which are not so long to wait. It is possible to achieve even interim accords on Transnistria and to convince the electorate in the need to preserve the current ruling elite in Chisinau, as only this elite is able to sign documents and finally solve the Transnistria problem right after the elections. After which, new circumstances may emerge.
The ‘new old’ negotiations are necessary for Transnistria, too. Tiraspol leaders are perfectly aware that time is working for Transnistria, so they use every slightest opportunity to mark time. Actually, the unchangeable leaders of the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldovan Republic have been marking time in such manner for 18 years now, which lets them state that despite the unresolved conflict, a whole generation of young people have already grown up who are proud they were born in the Transnistrian republic.
The OSCE mediators and the EU and U.S.A. observers are also interested in achieving a solution to prevent aggravation of tension. The European Union needs to have a controllable and predictable partner in the person of Moldova. Besides, Brussels is extremely interested in preserving stability and suppression of a hotbed of instability, Transnistria, which exists in the immediate proximity to the EU borders after their recent advancement to the east.
The United States, which has created unilaterally a hazardous-most precedent by recognizing Kosovo’s independence, does not want a further spread of the undesirable precedent on the domino principle. Washington was somewhat late to realize the risks to the existing world order that are emerging due to the recognition of Kosovo. The White House realizes that events in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their recognition by Russia may repeat in other regions. So, the United States will be trying to reduce the number of such frozen conflicts.
And, finally, in the new political situation, Russia appears to need the talks on Transnistria and normalization there even more than the conflicting sides do. Having found itself in a stiff confrontation with the United States and the European Union on principal issues, new Russia President Dmitry Medvedev is full of resolution to demonstrate to the West the Russian Federation’s peacekeeping capability. Also, he wants to prove that Russia preserves its influence in the FSU area, is acting in conformity with the situation, and can use both force and political methods to handle conflict-like situations. The Transnistrian settlement is precisely the example when Russia wants to use methods other than forcible ones, i.e. to use the carrot, not the stick.
After the expected Voronin/Smirnov meeting, the two may meet with President Dmitry Medvedev and sign in his presence some documents on trust measures and/or on principles of the would-be conflict settlement. This may have a déjà vu effect, on the example of July 21, 1992 when Moldovan President Mircea Snegur and Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov signed an agreement on ceasing the armed conflict in the presence of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and even raised glasses of champagne to mark the occasion, for which Snegur was repeatedly criticized in Chisinau later on.
Such meeting may become the most considerable success of the negotiations, for, really, one cannot count on more in the present-day situation. One should not share the optimism of those who believe that the problem can be solved tomorrow and that the 2009 parliamentary elections will be held in an already reunited country. This is just impossible for many reasons, and primarily because the interests of the 5+2 format talk participants differ considerably in what concerns the achievement of a final result.
Russia is now speaking of “negotiations on Transnistria-Moldova settlement in a tripartite format”, and is not ruling out a possibility of returning to the Kozak Memorandum that stipulated the building of an asymmetrical federation and was rejected by Moldova in November 2003. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov even stated recently that practically all the sides involved in the conflict settlement work “are now convinced of the need to return to those very principles that were so close to becoming accords in 2003”.
But Chisinau would not want even to hear about whatever federation, and is considering a possibility of settling the conflict on the basis of the documents adopted unanimously by the Moldovan Parliament in the summer of 2005. Also, some people are mentioning the existence of a new plan that was, allegedly, worked out by Moldovan experts, but is being kept in great secrecy. Now, depending on the situation, Moldovan officials are either admitting the existence of such plan or refuting any suppositions about such plan.
Throughout this September, the Moldovan president, prime minister, parliament speaker, foreign minister, reintegration minister were busy expressing adherence to the 5+2 format and refuting all statements on the tripartite format. Chisinau just cannot afford resolving the Transnistria problem outside the 5+2 format, for its revision would mean ignoring the position of the European Union and the United States, which have assumed the role of observers (not at all onlookers) over the Transnistrian conflict settlement. Moldova, longing for a new status of relations with the European Union and for an associated membership of the EU, cannot indeed ignore the Brussels’ position, for this would mean an end to Moldova's striving for Europe and a full dependence on Russia, when this republic may be forced to accept a settlement plan by far tougher than the Kozak Memorandum.
At the same time, Moscow representatives, including Russian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Moldova Valery Kuzmin, are not ruling out completely the possibility of holding negotiations in such a restricted format, not to mention Transnistria, whose leaders would be happy to work in such format. They do not wish to hear anything about the new plan of Chisinau’s, and they regard the documents adopted by the Moldovan Parliament in 2005 as the chief obstacle to conflict settlement. Not criticizing the Kozak Memorandum openly, the Transnistria leaders presume that its time has gone, and that it is now necessary to speak not about a federation but about recognition of Transnistria. Smirnov repeatedly stated lately that Moldova must be the first to recognize the independence of Transnistria. He is waiting for an official reply to the draft Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation (between the two independent states), which he handed in to President Voronin at their meeting in Bendery last April 11.
Upon lifting the moratorium on contacts with Chisinau, Igor Smirnov returned to his previous line of conduct. The Transnistrian delegation to the Joint Control Commission (JCC) requested to reinforce the peacekeeping potential in the region in apprehension of Chisinau’s aggression. And himself Smirnov celebrated with a great pomp on September 17 an anniversary of the referendum on Transnistria’s independence. He stated on that day that in the negotiation process, the principal thing for Transnistria has always been the equality of the sides and fulfillment of accords reached previously. He also stated that Transnistria has more legal, economic, historic and real rights for its recognition as an independent state than anybody else.
It is thus apparent that one cannot yet speak about any fruitful negotiations. Like always, Chisinau and Tiraspol are to agree upon mutually acceptable principles of settlement, but this depends on them the least. The Transnistria question is being solved in one block with other global problems, so it is too early yet to say that a settlement is near, the more so that it is hard to exclude or disregard the position of any of the 5+2 format participant.
Meanwhile, Moscow’s present-day relationship with Brussels and Washington are such that any Russian plan of settlement will face a fierce resistance to be offered by the West. And vice versa.
